Recently papers investigating problems on detection of the moment of occurrence of an attack on various systems were published. In particular, they consider "Dos-attacks" or attacks like of "denial of service" in a computing system and subsequent changes of the protocol of processing of input assignments. These studies are actual now.
Introduction
Recently papers investigating problems on detection of the moment of occurrence of an attack on various systems were published. In particular, they consider "Dos-attacks" or attacks like of "denial of service" in a computing system and subsequent changes of the protocol of processing of input assignments [6] . These studies are actual now. In the paper [4] the problems of the dynamic allocation of resources between protection of a system which consists of several modules of the same type, and the creation of new modules for this system are investigated.
The main difference between the paper and work [4] is in selection of another formula for setting the probability of a system destruction. Another major difference is the use of beta distribution instead of a truncated normal distribution for specifying distribution of a random moment of occurrence of attacks.
Preliminary Notes
The probability of destruction of some working system consisting of one module as a result of the alleged "attack", if the resource protection is equal to q and the resource of the attack is equal to Q plays an important role in the present study. It is assumed that a survivability of an operating system is not included in the resource of the protection, i. e. we are talking about new additional resources that can be brought in the system for its extra protection. The next formula
where q is a resource of protection, Q is a resource of attack, m ≥ 0 is a parameter characterizing the intensity of the conflict was used in [3] as a basic formula for calculating the probability of a system failure. As noted in [4] formula (1) has been widely used for the calculation of this type probabilities [1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9] . Wasser (2013) explains its flexibility in the rent seeking contests with incomplete information, when dealing with the Tullock lottery contest. Bier and Hausken (2013) illustrate its practicability in the research of intentional attacks on traffic network. The discussion of the application of (1) in stockpiling resource contests can be found in Levitin and Hausken (2011) .
However, on close examination, it is easy to see the significant deficiencies in the basic formula (1) used to calculate the probability of failure for given values of resources q and Q. Indeed, if q = 0, then for every arbitrarily small Q, as follows from (1) the probability of failure v(0, Q) = 1, that is contrary to common sense. After all any functioning system has some survivability, mathematically speaking, it has some stability. An infinitesimal external influence can't destroy the functioning of the operating system, especially with a probability equal to one. The probability v(0, Q) must depend on Q and change from some small non-negative values to unity with increasing Q from zero to infinity.
Another disadvantage of (1) is the next corollary from it which consists in the fact that under the condition of equality of resources Q and q the probability of failure of the system v(Q, Q) = 1 2 for any value of Q. This corollary also raises doubts as to the correctness of formula (1) . Especially considering the independence of the probability v(Q, Q) from the resource level Q. Undoubtedly, the specific numeric values of the probability of failure of the system essentially depend on the the characteristics and nature of the functioning of the studied system and may not be the same for all systems. Formula (1) can not adequately estimate the probability of failure of each system without taking account the specific conditions of its functioning. Detected shortages do not allow to use (1) for practical calculations of the probability of failure of specific systems. Let us formulate some obvious requirements to the probability of failure v(q, Q) of some system, consisting of one module, when the resource of the protection system is equal to q and used resource of the attack on the system is equal to Q :
holds and lim 
The following quality lim
q→∞ v(q, Q) = 0 ∀ Q ≥ 0, holds. 3. The function v(q, Q) is continuous if q ∈ [0, ∞), Q ∈ [0, ∞).
From conditions 1 and 3 it follows that lim
It is evident that formula (1) does not satisfy the above requirements. Condition 3 has technical nature, but seems quite reasonable and even necessary. Transform (1) so that all of the above conditions have been fulfilled. As easily seen, the function satisfies the above conditions, when it is determined by the next equality
where α 1 (1 > α 1 ≥ 0) is a parameter, determining the stability of the system at zero resources of protection and attack, β 1 > 0, α 2 > 0 are parameters, allowing to adapt model of probability (2) taking into account expert estimates. As can be seen from (2), under condition q = 0 and the small Q the probability of failure of the system is not equal to 1, due to the stability of the operating system. The probability of failure of the system at zero resource of the attack and the protection v(0, 0) = α 1 can be estimated on the base of the analysis of opinion of experts and, therefore, can be found an expert estimation of the parameter α 1 . The probability v(Q, Q) for a specific resource values Q can also be evaluated as a result of a survey of experts which will lead to the construction of estimates of the parameters β 1 , α 2 . Thus, the model defined by (2), can be adapted to the description of the functioning of the real system as a result of expert estimation, herewith the model of the probability of failure of the system (2) satisfies all above formulated conditions. In the future we will use (2), which is a modification of (1).
The introducing modification substantially changes the model and from our point of view makes model suitable for practical use.
Main Results
Let A be an intensity of increasing of the resource of attacks, i.e. for a time interval t the resource of attacks increases by the value of At. Let D be the intensity of resource of the protection, i.e. for a time interval t, the resource of protection increases by the value Dt. Let r(t) be the proportion of the resource allocated for the duplication of modules at time t, of course, 0 ≤ r(t) ≤ 1. Let C be the cost for creating one new module, then p = D C is the maximum possible intensity of creation of new modules. Further we assume that m = 1 to simplify the formulas.
Let us assume that at t = 0 the system consists of one module. We are interested in the time interval [0, T ], in during which at random time the system is under the attack, which can lead to failure in the work of the system. We also assume that modules of the same type are connected in parallel and the failure of the system is possible only if all modules are failure. is an integer part of a number. On the one hand, the creation of new modules reduces the probability of the system of failure in general, but on the other hand, resources spent on the duplication could be spent on strengthening the protection of existing modules that, as can be seen from (2), would decrease the probability of failure of each individual module and hence would reduce the probability of failure of the whole system. Thus, the problem is to allocate rationally a resource of protection between the rising of the security of each individual module (it will be assumed that tools of protection evenly distributed between the individual modules) and duplication of similar modules. This assumes that the duplicated modules operate in parallel.
It is easy to see that
hold, where q and Q are respectively the resource of protection and the resource of attack at t. Using (2) and (3) leads to more complex expression for the conditional probability V (t, r(t)) of the destruction of the entire system provided that the attack occurs at time t than in [4] :
. (4) The degree in formula (4) is connected with the independent functioning modules of the same type due to their parallel connection. In principle there are two approaches for building mathematical models. The first approach is to consider the game theoretical model of conflict as a game of two persons with zero sum. The first player protects the system by distributing the available resources of protection between the protection of existing modules and creating new modules (duplication), and the second player attacks the system, choosing the time of the attack.
The second approach consists in considering of the conflict as a game with the "nature". On the basis of previous experience the some probability distribution for time of attack may be selected. After that we can take the mathematical expectation by integrating on the chosen distribution. The second approach was chosen in [4] where the truncated normal distribution was applied as the probability distribution of the time of the attack.
In our opinion, in practical situations it is much more better to use the beta distribution instead of truncated normal one, because the beta distribution is defined on the interval, the parameters of beta distribution can be easy estimated from the statistical data. In addition beta distribution contains a very diverse range of different densities, allowing to choose a suitable distribution for probabilistic description of studied conflict process. In contrast to [4] the beta distribution will be considered.
The standard density of the beta distribution has the form
where µ, ν > 0 are fixed parameters, B(µ, ν)
In our problem the interval [0, T ] is considered, so from the random variable ξ it is necessary to go to a random variable η = T ξ, which entails a modification of the density distribution
Thus, in the second approach, we come to the objective function
which represents the probability of failure of the whole system in consequence of an attack at some time within the period [0, T ]. The problem is to minimize P T (r(·)) on the class of functions K = {r(t)}. We will consider a set of constants K = {r | 0 ≤ r ≤ 1}. For the chosen class of functions some expressions are greatly simplified. So the conditional probability takes the form
Let p = 1,
Consequently, formulae (5) and (6) can be written as follows
where
Let T = 1, then [rt] = 0 for all t ∈ (0, T ), then from (8) we obtain V (t, r) = 0.5 + t 1 + (2 − r)t Obviously, the minimum possible value P T (r(.)) is reached at r * = 0. The obtained optimal value is completely consistent with the intuitive view, since the condition [rt] = 0 implies that on the time interval (0, T ) we cannot create a new module and, therefore, resources should not be allocated on the construction of new modules, i.e. all resources of protection should be used to ensure for the reliable functioning of the existing module. From (5) it is also easy to notice that for large values of T the strategy of allocation of the resource r = 1 while is not optimal, but leads to smaller values of the failure probability P T (r(·)) of the whole system, than the strategy r = 0. If r = 0, then from (7) we obtain , if T > 6. So P T (1) < P T (0) for T > 6. If T > 6, then the strategy r = 1 is better than the strategy r = 0.
